### INCOMING TELEGRAM

## Department of Stule

SECRET

M Action SS

Info

FROM: New Delhi

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1334, Optaber 23, 6 P.M.

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October 23, 1962

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Control: 17360

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1334, INTORMATION USUN PRIORITY 65

ELITE EYES CMLY

Reference: Department telegrams 1605 and circular 703

I saw Prime Minister at noon for 45 minutes and made strongest possible case in Cuba. Before giving him documents contained reference telegrams I outlined political force of Cuban issue in US, parallel to similar installation of Communist power in Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, effect in public opinion and in turn on administration when knowledge became general of muclear missile installations covering eastern US-Caribbean area. I pictured action as mild as possible in circumstances and them to avoid diffusing attention pressed hard on two requests to-wit: Avoidance of adverse Indian statements which might give lead to other meutrals as well as Communists and support for UN proposals.

I them asked him to do me favor of reading both documents, having in mind that speech was as eloquent as covering letter was lousy.

Prime Minister listened closely and them read both documents with great care taking 15 to 20 minutes to do so. He was I think impressed. He them asked some details about missiles

and I'

SECRET

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#### SECRET

-2- 1334, October 23, 6 P.M., from New Delhi

and I took opportunity to restate main points. Conversation then turned to Chinese border where he noted latest Chinese statement that they would no longer recognize the MacMahon Line and this gave me opportunity to affirm our general position of sympathy and support.


I will see M. J. Desai later in the day to put our needs in completely plain language. Without being completely sure I venture to think Indian position may be reasonably in hand. Having shown determination, emphasis on UN, acceptance of UN observers at sites, any other conciliatory alternatives to high seas, search and seigure obviously help our case here.

GALERAITH

MJA

# **EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

## Department of Stuie



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SECRET

Action SS

Info

FROM: New Delhi

TO: Secretary of State

1334, Octaber 23, 6 P.M. NO:

DEPARTMENT OF MARE PARTOCIME

October 23, 1962

Cor.trol: 17360

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT 1334, INFORMATION USUN PRIORITY 65

ELITE EYES ONLY

Reference: Department telegrams 1605 and circular 703

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Prime Minister listened closely and then read both documents with great care taking 15 to 20 minutes to do so. He was I think impressed. He then asked some details about missiles

SECHET

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### SECRET

-2- 1334, October 25, 6 F.M., from New Delhi and I took opportunity to restate main points.

(S)(D)

I will see M. J. Desai later in the day to put our needs in completely plain language. Without being completely sure I venture to think Indian position may be reasonably in hand. Having shown determination, emphasis on UN, acceptance of UN observers at sites, any other consiliatory alternatives to high seas, search and seizure obviously help our case here.

GALBRAITH

MJA